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Abstract
In this paper we develop a model of the behavior of bidders in simultaneous as-
cending auctions based on two principles: principle of surplus maximization and the
principle of bid minimization. These principles lead to models of both price dynamics
and equilibration, leading to disequilibrium structural equations that can be used for
estimating bidder values. The intention behind the development of this methodology is
to provide an auctioneer a method of extracting information during an auction about
possible closing prices. We first benchmark the performance of the model with data
from experimental auctions and then apply it to the U.K. UMTS or Third Generation
Mobile auction.
Key Words: Multiple Unit Auctions, Value Estimation, Spectrum Auctions
JEL Codes: C7, C9, C5
1 Introduction
In recent years attention has been focused on a particular form of auction generally called
a simultaneous ascending auction (SAA), or simultaneous multiple round auction. It is the
form of auction used by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for auctioning
licenses to provide services in the electromagnetic broadcast spectrum and it has subse-
quently been adopted by other countries for the same purpose. Because of its widespread
use and the fact that these auctions can continue for months with hundreds of rounds,
interest exists in trying to model the dynamics of this price discovery process, including
how long the auction will last and where the final prices might settle. This paper focuses
on those issues.
A simultaneous ascending auction (SAA) is a multiple unit auction in which all of the
objects are up for sale simultaneously using an English auction-like format in which the
prices of the objects are increased by the bidders until a stopping criteria is reached. In
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the US, auctions of this sort have yielded total net high bids of over $40 billion1 and recent
auctions in the UK and Germany have raised $33 billion2 and $45 billion3 in single auctions.
In the early auctions run by the FCC, some of them ran up to 6 months4, although most of
the more recent auctions have concluded within one. The third generation mobile auction
in the UK lasted for 150 rounds or about a month and a half. Due to the length of time
and amount of money involved in these auctions, it can be useful to both the auctioneer
and bidders to be able to gain some insight into possible auction duration and revenue
predictions as the auctions progress.
In this paper, we will develop a model of bidder behavior that is quite simple yet also
quite powerful that is based on the ability of bidders to arbitrage between diﬀerent types of
items as the prices adjust during the auction and use it to derive an econometric technique
for estimating bidder values. This model will first be tested on experimental data to assess
the degree of accuracy of the fundamental behavioral principles that are at the core of
the model and we also benchmark the performance of the estimation methodology on the
experimental data. Finally, we will apply the estimation technique to the data generated
by the recent U.K. Third Generation Mobile Auction (UK 3G).
The point of exploring this model is to determine if it is possible to extract some infor-
mation from the pattern of bids in an auction while it is progressing that an auctioneer can
use in determining the pacing of the auction. This is an important issue in practical auction
conduct as each day an auction continues can cost bidders substantial sums of money in
terms of cash outlays as well as opportunity costs. Proper conduct of an auction should
seek to minimize this expense to the bidders. In conducting an auction of this sort an
auctioneer has a number of tools at their disposal to impact pacing of the auction including
setting minimum bid increments, round schedules and, in FCC auctions, determining stage
transitions. The most important information the auctioneer needs in making decisions on
how to adjust these elements is how far the auction is from concluding. If the current prices
are in the hundred dollar range while the final prices are expected to be in the billion dollar
range, there is little reason not to set very high minimum bid increments. As the auction
nears conclusion, however, one might reasonably want to set lower bid increments in order
to maximize eﬃciency and revenue. In our field application we will be trying to determine
the extent to which this model would have been useful in providing such information to
supplement any pre-auction estimates the auctioneer might have had.
Section 2 includes a brief overview of related literature and explains how and why
1This includes 33 total auctions as of April 2001. It should be noted that the total revenue raised by
these auctions is much less than this total due to a large number of defaults following the first C Block PCS
Auction, or FCC Auction #5.
2This revenue total is for the UK Third Generation Wireless Acution (UK 3G). See Department of Trade
and Industry Press Release P/2000/296 or for more information http://www.spectrumauctions.gov.uk/.
3This revenue total is for the Germany’s Third Generation Wireless Acution. See http://www.regtp.de/
for more information.
4The two longest were the PCS C Block (Auction #5) which began on 12/18/1995, ended 5/6/1996 and
the PCS DEF Block (Auction #11) which began 8/26/1996 and ended 1/14/1997.
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the model employed here departs from that literature. Section 3 describes the general
rules of this class of auctions and the specializations used here. Section 4 will explain the
theoretical structure behind the behavioral model and econometric analysis used in this
paper. Section 5 will detail the experiments used to evaluate the model as well as the
results of the experimental tests. Section 6 contains the results from an application of the
model on the field data and section 7 will conclude.
2 Background Literature
The information extraction that is attempted in this paper takes the form of estimating
bidder values in the auction using the data that is currently available in the auction. There
is a well-developed existing literature on estimating bidder values in single unit auctions as
in ?), ?), ?), and ?). The basic approach underlying all of these approaches is to assume
that the bidders are bidding according to a risk-neutral Nash equilibrium bid function and
then try to find distributions of values that are most consistent with the observed bids and
the RNN assumption. The problem with this approach is that, as has been observed in
countless laboratory experiments, bidders consistently bid well above the level predicted by
a RNN equilibrium5.
To our knowledge there is only one other paper that tries to estimate bidder values in
simultaneous ascending auctions with heterogeneous objects, ?). In this paper, the authors
derive an estimator by solving for equilibrium bid functions under the assumptions of a
common value single unit ascending auction and then try to apply it to specific licenses
in one of the early FCC PCS auctions. This approach is highly problematic in regard to
the fact that the estimator is misspecified for the environment to which it is applied. To
their credit, the authors do note this diﬃculty. Even if one were to overlook that issue,
though, it would not be possible to apply their methodology before the end of an auction.
Their approach is based on the standard common value ascending auction bidding strategy
based on bidders observing drop-out points of other bidders and then updating their beliefs
accordingly on the value of the license. The problem is that until the auction is over, no
bidder has necessarily dropped out of the bidding on that item, unless they have dropped
out of the auction completely.
It is clear that the methodology applied in ?), while perhaps well developed for single-
unit ascending auctions, is not well specified for SAAs. It is, however, useful as a benchmark
for explaining how and why our approach is diﬀerent from other approaches to estimating
bidder values in auctions in the cited literature. All of the methodologies cited above rely on
the assumption that bidders bid according to risk neutral Nash equilibrium bid functions.
We believe that this is an overly restrictive assumption for the case of SAAs. While we could
generate specific value structures with corresponding belief structures that would support
5The literature on this is large and while the contributors are quite contentiously divided as to why
bidders bid above the RNNE level, the literature seems quite unanimous that it occurs systematically. See
?) for a good survey and introduction.
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the strategy we will be using as a Bayes Nash equilibrium, it will only satisfy any perfection
criteria under very specific value distributions and even then only under hairline conditions
on the preferences of the bidders. Thus trying to claim that its status as an equilibrium
somehow lends it extra credibility seems less than compelling. Solving for more “realistic”
equilibria is by no means an easy task and since there are likely to be a large number of
them, we do not see a great deal to be gained in picking one out which is unlikely to be any
more descriptive of the bidding behavior than the strategy we will be using. An examination
of equilibrium behavior in ascending auctions that explains the theoretical results behind
these statements more precisely can be found in ?).
Our approach is based on proposing a simple behavioral heuristic that can be taken as a
simplification of the behavior of the bidders. Due to the diﬃculty of solving for equilibria in
such environments and the tendency for bidders not to follow them precisely even in single
unit auctions, there should be little loss from dropping the assumption that bidders would
all solve for the same equilibrium and actually follow the equilibrium strategy carefully.
Through the use of experiments we will show that it is a reasonable, though imperfect,
approximation of actual bidding behavior. More importantly, we will show how this model
can be used in estimating values from field auctions and will provide evidence from both the
experimental and field data that although the model will fail on certain types of bidders,
the ones for whom it will tend to succeed are the ones for which it is most important to
succeed.
There is a related paper, ?), in which the authors find evidence that the behavioral
model we develop in this paper does not fully capture the behavior in the U.K. auction and
find that some bidders deviate substantially from it. We will make no claims in this paper
that such deviations do not exist or that the proposed model should be expected to capture
all of the behavioral elements that will exist in a real auction. Our goal is to take this simple
model and determine how well it can perform in allowing us to form mid-auction predictions
about closing prices in spite of its defects. To be very clear, we do not purport to show
that this model can perfectly predict all of the individual bidding behavior observed in the
auction nor is there any requirement that it be able to for the use to which we will apply
it. It is actually not even necessarily true that perfectly predicting individual bids improves
the performance of the model for our task as will be shown later. The question at hand is
whether or not there is useful information contained in the pattern of bids of an ascending
auction that can be extracted with this methodology that an auctioneer might be able to
make use of. This is an empirical question that is not answered by looking only at the
ability of the model to predict individual bids. There is certainly room for the construction
of improvements to the model and accounting for some of the deviations found in ?) could
help but currently there does not appear to be a systematic way to accomplish this.
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3 Rules of Simultaneous Ascending Auctions
There is not a single set form for a SAA, but rather there are a few basic rules with each
auctioneer usually inserting their own variations to tailor the form to their needs. We will
describe here the basic rules for this class of auctions as well as the specializations of these
rules used for the experiments and the field application. There are six basic rules or classes
of rules in these auctions.
1. Objects Auctioned Simultaneously: This means that the market for each item
in the auction is simultaneously opened and closed. No item is considered sold or no
market is considered closed until all items have been sold or all markets closed.
2. Structure of Bid Submission: The option here is a discrete versus continuous time
process. In a continuous time process, bids may be submitted at any instant of time,
with each submission generating a new set of provisional winners that are immediately
announced. If a discrete process is used, the auction progresses in a series of sealed
bid rounds. All bids are submitted in a sealed bid fashion during some designated
period and then all bids and new provisional winners are announced simultaneously
with a new sealed bid round beginning later. The experiments for this study were run
using a continuous time process while the UK3G auction was conducted as a discrete
time process.
3. Increment Requirements: As a mechanism for pacing an auction, an auctioneer
will typically employ some requirement that a new bid meet a minimum increment
requirement. In the experiments, there was a requirement that a new bid be 5%
greater than the previous high bid on the item. In the UK3G auction, the auction
began with a 5% increment and then that was adjusted down in steps as the auction
progressed to a 1.5% increment.
4. Eligibility Rules. In some SAA’s there are restrictions on how many and/or which
items a bidder may place bids on in any given round. In the experiments, bidders
were allowed to have a high bid on at most one item at a time6. In the UK3G auction,
there was a similar restriction along with a restriction that certain bidders could not
win one of the items. This will be discussed in more detail later.
5. Activity Rules: These rules are designed to spur activity in an auction and diminish
a bidders incentive to wait until the end to bid. In the continuous time auctions studied
here, there are no activity rules and the job of forcing bids is relegated to the stopping
rule. For the UK3G auction, in any given round a bidder must either be a provisional
winner from the previous round or must place a new bid. If they do not, the bidder
6The software does, however, allow for a bidder to raise their own high bid. As will be seen later, this
allowed one bidder to make some very serious and costly mistakes. As followers of FCC auctions might be
aware, such behavior, though potentially highly irrational, is not isolated to laboratory subjects.
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loses the right to bid in all future rounds. Many SAAs including the UK3G auction
do allow bidders a certain number of waivers that can be used to suspend the activity
rules in a given period for that bidder.
6. Stopping Rule: A stopping rule is used to determine when the auction closes. In a
continuous time process, a countdown clock is typically used that starts the auction
with a certain amount of time, three minutes in the experiments, and begins to count
down. With each new bid, the clock is reset and the auction closes when the clock
reaches zero. In a discrete time process, such as the UK3G auction, the auction ends
the first period for which no new bids are submitted.
4 Theory
4.1 Model of Bidder Behavior
The model of bidder behavior that we will use in this paper is based on the following two
principles:
Principle of Surplus Maximization: When faced with a decision, a bidder will place
their bid on the item that maximizes their surplus given the current prices in the auction.
This implies a decision rule defined by equation 1 where ci(t) indicates the item that
bidder i places a bid on in period t. vi(k) denotes the value bidder i places on item k while
pt(k) is the price of item k at time t.
ci(t) = argmax
k
[vi(k)− pt(k)] (1)
Principle of Minimum Bid: When choosing an amount to bid, the individual chooses
the minimal possible price allowed by the system.
If we let M be the minimum increment required for a new bid (e.g. .05), this principle
says that the bid actually placed by an individual will be an amount equal to the minimum
required bid which is defined as:
pt(ci(t)) = (1 +M)pt−1(ci(t)) (2)
The combination of the two principles suggest that the manner in which an individual
bidder will behave is that they will examine the current price vector and compare it with
their value function to determine which item would maximize their surplus. This is the item
they will place a bid on. When placing the bid, they will bid at the minimum level required
by the auctioneer. This rule is a simple extrapolation of the basic single unit ascending
auction strategy to multiple units and similar principles have been used successfully for
modeling the behavior observed in combinatorial auctions as in ?) and was described in ?)
as “straight-forward” bidding while being used to prove various properties of SAAs in the
event that bidders behave in this manner.
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4.2 Preferences
In order to make inferences about the values held by bidders using this methodology, it
is necessary to make some fairly strong conjectures about the underlying structure of bid-
der preferences. For other field applications, such conjectures would be based upon the
information available to field observers as was done here. We will use the value function
found in equation 3 to describe the structure of bidder preferences in this context. This is a
simple value function that is specified to deal with auctions in which the diﬀerence in value
between the items can be characterized by a single characteristic across which the items are
vertically diﬀerentiated. For the field application used here, the important characteristic
that diﬀerentiates objects is assumed to be the amount of MHz of spectrum in the license.
vi(k) = γim(K) + βi(m(k)−m(K)) (3)
In equation 3, m(k) is the amount of the crucial characteristic, or MHz of spectrum,
item k contains and m(K) is the number of MHz in the item with the smallest amount.
The parameter γi represents the dollar per MHz value for the first m(K) MHz in a license
and βi reflects the value for marginal amounts of the characteristic above this base level.
For simplicity, in the experimental setup we will set βi = γi. When the model is fitted on
the field data set, this will not be assumed.
4.3 Econometric Specification
The mechanism through which this model is able to identify the values a bidder has for the
items is in the “switching” behavior evidenced by the bidder. In other words, if a bidder is
bidding according to this model, they reveal the value diﬀerential they see between the items
when they switch from bidding on one item to another. This switch reveals that for certain
price combinations, bidding on item A was more profitable but for the current prices, item
B is more profitable. Consider the hypothetical profile in table 1. In this case, the first
time the bidder places a bid, the price for item A is 100 and item B is 90. According to the
bidding rule, if item A is worth at least 10 more than B, then the bidder should bid on A.
In this case they did. The bidder continues to bid on A until pt(A) = 130 and pt(B) = 110.
In this case, the price diﬀerential is 20 and the bidder chooses instead to bid on B. If they
were bidding according to this model, then they have just revealed that they believe A is
worth somewhere between 15 and 20 more than a B item. The value estimation procedure
eﬀectively tracks any such switches made by a bidder and attempts to hone in on the most
likely critical value of the price diﬀerential.
When presented with a choice situation of this sort, it is common to observe that bidders
tend to make “errors” more often when the diﬀerence in surplus between the various items is
small rather than when the diﬀerence is large. Consequently, we will be using a probabilistic
version of the choice rule defined in equation 4. ρi(k) is the probability that bidder i will
bid on item k, pt(k) is the price of item k in period t . It should be clear that as the surplus
for item k grows relative to the surplus for the other items, this probability rises. The
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Round Item Bid on pt(A) pt(B) pt(A)− pt(B)
5 A 100 90 10
8 A 120 105 15
12 B 130 110 20
15 A 135 120 15
Table 1: Hypothetical bid profile. If a bidder placed bids in this manner, they have revealed
that they believe that an A item is worth somewhere between 15 and 20 more than a B
item.
parameter λi in this equation is a parameter that measures the propensity of the bidder to
best respond.
ρi(k) =
(vi(k)− pt(k))λiP
j (vi(j)− pt(j))
λi (4)
Note that the methodology as described appears to be best at identifying diﬀerences in
relative values of items in the auction. Specifically this implies a strong identification for β
as this is the parameter that measures the diﬀerence in value between the license groups.
The actual level of the values, determined by γ, is more diﬃcult to obtain identification for.
When β = γ, the identification is trivial but otherwise this requires a careful specification of
the probabilistic choice function. Common specifications such as the logit, pi(k) = e
A(k)P
eA(t) ,
result in probabilities invariant to the addition of a constant into each of the A(k) terms
which would leave γ unidentified. The power specification defined in equation 4 is not
invariant to the addition of constants7. This is what leads to the technical identification
of γ. Empirically this will be weaker, of course, but both parameters are identified. Since
neither the logit or power probabilistic specification is “right” the question will be whether
the power specification is empirically “close enough”. That can only be judged by examining
the results from applying the model.
The model of bidder behavior described in the preceding section can be transformed
into an econometric model for estimating the parameters of the value function by using an
objective function as seen in equation 58. This specification is the form of the objective
function used for the field data application. ρk is used to denote the probability that a
bidder will be predicted to choose to place a bid on item k ∈ [1, 5] or choose to withdraw
from the auction, k = 6. The latter should happen when there is no surplus available for
any items in the auction for that bidder. ρ∗ is the probability with which the bidder was
predicted to bid on the item they actually did bid on in that period. The loss function used
here is not the standard log-likelihood function that is more typically used for models like
7Very simply consider adding some constant k to to amounts a and b: a+k
(a+k)+(b+k) 6= aa+b but e
a+k
ea+k+eb+k =
ekea
ek(ea+eb) =
ea
ea+eb .
8There is obviously a correction in the estimation routine for the case in which surpluses on all items are
negative causing all probabilities of bidding to be zero which is not represented in the equation.
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this, but rather a quadratic loss function. This is necessary to avoid the “hypersensitivity”
problem as described in ?) and ?) since this will be especially problematic in this case
due to the fact that many of the predicted probabilities will be close to 0 and 1. The
log-likelihood function can induce some strange results due to its diﬀerential treatment of
underprediction of low probability events from underprediction of high probability events
and in particular the way it deals with events predicted to occur with zero probability.
max
γi
TX
t=1
[2ρ∗(t)−
6X
j=1
ρ2j ] (5)
ρk =
(
(max(γim(K)+βi(m(k)−m(K))−pt(k),0))λiP5
l=1(max(γim(K)+βi(m(l)−m(K))−pt(l)),0))
λi if k ∈ [1, 5]
1−
P5
l=1 ρl else
Although the model is used here with a very simple 2 parameter value function in which
there is only one characteristic that diﬀerentiates items, significantly more complex value
functions could be used. The one used here was chosen because it seemed as if it would
be a reasonable characterization of the values for bidders in the UK 3G auction. Such a
simple function is not going to be at all worthwhile for examining auctions such as those
held in the US that have licenses that are both horizontally and vertically diﬀerentiated. It
is possible that these more complex situations can be examined with this methodology by
designing more appropriate value functions, but this has not yet been investigated.
4.4 Equilibrium Prices
As part of our analysis, it will be necessary to be able to make equilibrium price predictions.
In this context, equilibrium occurs at a vector of prices in which no bidder who is not a
provisional winner has a non zero surplus (above the increment requirement). Obviously
many equilibria of this sort exist, but the only equilibrium that we will study systematically
is the eﬃcient equilibrium.
For an example on how to actually perform this calculation we will use the values used
in the experiments that are found in table 2. The bidders have been represented in table 2
in an ordered fashion, with the bidder who values items the most as bidder 1 and the bidder
who values them least as bidder 12. This is done for convenience. In the experiments,
bidders were identified by random numbers between 501 and 512 such that bidder 501 did
not necessarily correspond to bidder 1 in table 2. For clarity, bidders will be referred to by
their number in this table rather than their bidder id from the experiments.
The displayed ordering allows for a convenient way to calculate equilibrium prices. They
can be found by finding the price at which the last excluded bidder is just willing to be
excluded. In the case used in the experiments with 12 bidders and 4 items of each type, this
means the price of the B items is set at the price which just makes the ninth bidder prefer to
take his outside option. This is so since bidder 9 will prefer to bid on any B item below this
price rather than take his outside option, but prefer the outside option to bidding on any B
9
Bidder Number Value A Value B Outside Option
1 8,000 6,800 2,500
2 7,660 6,511 2,394
3 7,320 6,222 2,288
4 6,980 5,933 2,181
5 6,640 5,644 2,075
6 6,300 5,355 1,959
7 5,960 5,066 1,863
8 5,620 4,777 1,756
9 5,280 4,488 1,650
10 4,940 4,199 1,544
11 4,600 3,910 1,438
12 4,260 3,621 1,331
Equilibrium Price 3,834 2,838 N/A
Table 2: Bidder values used in experiments.
items above this price. The price for the A items is set by finding the price at which bidder
number 5 is just indiﬀerent to winning a B item to an A item, given the already determined
equilibrium price of the B items. If there are any A items priced below this point, bidder
5 will prefer to bid on them rather than a B item, in equilibrium. These calculations are
summarized in equations 6 and 7 the actual equilibrium prices are listed at the bottom of
table 2.
p∗B = V9(B)−O9 (6)
p∗A = V5(A)− (p∗B − V5(B)) (7)
4.5 Auction Duration
The two fundamental principles lead naturally to a model for predicting auction duration
based on opening prices, the minimum bid increment and bidder values. The first step in
making predictions of auction duration requires obtaining estimates of closing prices based
upon the estimated values. Once these are obtained, the predicted maximum number of
bids for each license can be computed by using the following formula:
sk,e = (1 +M)bksk,0 (8)
where sk,e is the predicted equilibrium price for item k, M is the minimum bid increment
(0.05 in the experiments), bk is the number of bids and sk,0 is the starting price of item k.
The opening price, sk,0 and the increment, M, are known, with sk,e estimated the implied
number of bids can be solved for.
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It is diﬃcult to translate predictions on the number of bids that should be received in a
continuous auction to a clock-time based time to complete as this requires modeling the time
it takes a bidder to submit a bid. When running multiple field auctions of similar types,
better estimates of time to complete can be obtained over time by getting estimates of the
distributions of bid increments bidders use in those auctions as well as the time it takes for
a bidder to submit a bid. These can then be combined to predict auction duration in future
auctions. Translating predicted number of bids into a predicted number of rounds runs
into similar diﬃculties. Consequently, in order to make our comparisons between model
predictions and empirical results precise, we will present them both in terms of number of
new high bids.
5 Experiments
The first step of analysis involves testing the theory against experimental data. The pre-
viously described model involves many maintained hypotheses including those related to
preferences, bidding behavior, price equilibration, the nature of the equilibrium and even
the structure of the errors that appear in the bidders choice behavior. Any of these assump-
tions could be dramatically in error. The purpose of the experiments is to determine the
extent of that error or the degree to which the hypotheses are valid as well as the impact
on the likelihood of success of the estimation technique.
5.1 Design and Conduct
There were a total of 6 auctions run for this study in four separate sessions. In the fourth
session, three separate auctions using diﬀerent subjects were run independently but at the
same time. All 6 auctions were run as continuous Simultaneous Ascending Auctions using
the rules explained in section 3.
All of the auctions were run with fundamentally the same structure although there were
a few minor diﬀerences across some of the auctions as summarized in table 3. In auctions
1-5, there were 12 bidders competing for 8 objects. There were two types of objects, type
A and B, with four of each type. Each bidder was allowed to win at most one item in the
auction and each bidder had the same value for all items of a given type. In auction 6, there
were 8 bidders competing for 6 objects, three of each type.
The bidder values for these auctions were generated in accordance with the value func-
tion described in section 4. Items of type A were assumed to possess 40 units of the crucial
characteristic and type B items 34. Each bidder possessed a diﬀerent per unit value for the
items. Bidder 1 valued the items at a value of 200 francs per unit and the value for other
bidders decreased by 8.5 francs for bidder 2, 17 for bidder 3 and so on9. Bidders who did
9The fact that values were not constructed from a probability distribution is a deviation from standard
auction experimental procedure. In this case, the particular distribution of the values had no theoretical
impact on the model we were testing and therefore it was considered preferable to use defined values to allow
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Experiment Number of Each Item Number of Starting
Date A (m(a) = 40) B(m(B) = 34) Bidders Prices
1 - 6/08/2000 4 4 12 2100/1800
2 - 6/12/2000 4 4 12 2100/1800
3 - 6/22/2000 4 4 12 1000/1000
4 - 6/29/2000 4 4 12 1000/1000
5 - 6/29/2000 4 4 12 1000/1000
6 - 6/29/2000 3 3 8 1000/1000
Table 3: Details of experiment sessions.
not win an item in the auction were paid an amount indicated by their outside option value,
Oi, which was equal to a fraction of their value for a type A item. The precise equations
for determining the values for each bidder are given by equations 9-11. The actual values
are listed in table 2. These values are denominated in francs and translate into dollars at
the rate of 100 francs to $1.00. For auction 6, in which only 8 bidders participated, bidder
profiles corresponding to 2, 6, 11 and 12 were not used. Notice that since bidder identities
corresponding to 2, 6, 11 and 12 were not assigned in session 6 which was run with 8 bidders
and 6 items, bidders 9 and 5 were still the marginal bidders and therefore equilibrium prices
are the same in this auction as the others.
vi(A) = 40 ∗ (200− (i− 1) ∗ 8.5) (9)
vi(B) = 34 ∗ (200− (i− 1) ∗ 8.5) (10)
Oi = vi(A)/3.2 (11)
The experiments were conducted by recruiting mostly undergraduate students at the
California Institute of Technology to participate in a computerized experiment. The subjects
were brought into the lab and were first given an introductory instructional sheet to read
that explained the general rules of the experiment. The subjects were then asked to log into
a practice auction system and lead through an explanation of the interface and auction rules
according to a Verbal Instruction Script. Before proceeding into the experiment, subjects
were asked to complete a quiz that asked questions aimed at making sure the subjects
understood the payoﬀ rules and the system interface. Both the instruction sheet and the
quiz can be found in the appendix.
5.2 Results
There are three types of results from the experiments that need to be examined. The first
are benchmarks of the auctions performance in terms of eﬃciency and time to completion.
The second set of results will determine how well the behavioral rule does in predicting the
for easy comparability across sessions.
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choices made by the subjects. The last set of results will examine the performance of the
econometric models in estimating the true values of the subjects.
5.2.1 Eﬃciency and Final Prices
Result 1: Final prices are close to the eﬃcient equilibrium (set at margin by outside
option) and deviations can largely be attributed to rare major bidder errors or the minimum
increment requirement.
Figure 1 presents the closing prices from all experiment sessions in a histogram with
solid lines indicating where the equilibrium prices are and dotted lines indicating intervals
corresponding to one bid increment above and below the equilibrium prices. The figure
shows that there are only a few items whose prices ended up being diﬀerent from the equi-
librium values by more than can be accounted for by the use of a minimum bid increment10.
The average price of all A items is statistically indistinguishable from the equilibrium level.
The overall average price on A items is 3857 while the predicted price is 3834. The result-
ing t-statistic of a test that the diﬀerence between the two is equal to zero is 0.3762 with
a p-value of 0.7104. The results of a Wilcoxon signed-rank test are a Z-statistic of -0.5628
and p-value of 0.5736. For the B items, the average realized price is 2856, the equilibrium
price is 2838, and the corresponding t-statistic is 0.5809, p-value 0.5672 and a Wilcoxon Z
of 0.2587, p-value of 0.7958. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that the predictive
power of the equilibrium price setting mechanism is quite strong. Although mistakes by
individual bidders can aﬀect the actual prices, the mechanism is even robust enough to
account for the closing prices once such mistakes are factored in.
The fact that prices are so near the eﬃcient equilibrium prices suggests the second
result. The system is eﬃcient by any standards with the agents with the highest valuation
acquiring the appropriate items and the agents with the low valuations excluded. The
pattern is summarized by the next result.
Result 2: Eﬃciency exceeds baseline and is often near 100% (Those who should get
items get them and those who should not, do not.) Deviations are again largely attributable
to increment requirements and occasional major mistakes.
The bidder values in table 2 were setup such that in the eﬃcient allocation bidders 1-4
should win items 1-4, bidders 5-8 should win items 5-8 while bidders 9-12 should end up
taking their outside option. 19 of the 46 items auctioned did go to non-optimal bidders,
but typically these misallocations were quite minor and resulted from interactions between
the slight discrepancies between the actual prices and the equilibrium prices combined with
the minimum bid increment requirement. Further, only twice did bidders of types 9-12 end
10A closer inspection of the data reveals that those prices that do not fit in these bounds are predominantly
from experiment 2 and were the result of a serious mistake by one bidder and the ripple eﬀects to other
items.
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Figure 1: Histograms of closing prices. Equilibrium prices are represented by solid lines.
Dotted lines represent +/- one bid increment around equilibrium prices.
Experiment 1 2 3 4 5 6
Actual Eﬃciency 0.994 0.977 0.996 0.997 0.990 0.995
Baseline Eﬃciency 0.893 0.932
Table 4: Actual eﬃciency for each auction compared with baseline eﬃciency. Baseline
eﬃciency is the expected eﬃciency if items were assigned randomly.
up winning items and one of those was due to an already discussed egregious error on the
part of the bidder.
The actual eﬃciency scores for each experiment can be found in table 4. The maximum
potential value was calculated by adding the potential value in equilibrium with bidders 1-4
winning items 1-4 and bidders 5-8 winning items 5-8. The value of the outside option for
other bidders was excluded from the value of the auction. The realized value was calculated
by adding the actual value for each winning bidder, again ignoring outside option values of
non-winning bidders. As seen in the table, all of the eﬃciencies are close to 1 and all but
experiment 2 are within .01 of being right at 1.
These scores can be compared to a baseline of achievable eﬃciency that would be ob-
tained if the items were randomly assigned. In the 8 item auctions, this baseline is 0.893
and in the 6 item case it is 0.932. Consequently there is a definite improvement over a
random allocation achieved by the auction and although the improvement may not seem
large, the reason for this lack of a larger diﬀerence should be expected to make significant
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Experiment 1 2 3 4 5 6
# of Bids 69 57 135 136 112 50
# of Jumps 5 18 21 28 21 16
Latest Jump 11 55 132 122 92 37
# Prices Set 0 2 0 0 1 2
Table 5: Summary of jump bid activity in experiments.
diﬀerences more diﬃcult to obtain. The baseline eﬃciency is so high because there are not
many excluded bidders and their values are in general not more than a bid increment or two
less than the lowest winning bidders. By spacing the values so closely, it would not have
taken bids that were terribly irrational on the part of the excluded bidders to win an item.
One could easily imagine the improbable level of precision that would be required in con-
structing bids in single round sealed bid auctions that would lead to similar improvements
in the eﬃciency scores over random allocation. The fact that bidders 9-12 in general did
not win items is a testament to the robust nature of the price setting mechanism in these
auctions and the eﬃciency they can achieve.
A claim exists in the literature, summarized in ?), that SAAs have an Achilles heal in
that they allow for bidders to place “jump bids” or bids in excess of the minimum required
increment. They argue that this leads to prices far in excess of equilibrium prices and can
lead to significant ineﬃciency. There is little evidence for an eﬀect of this nature in these
auctions.
Observation 1: Jump bids are observed but their primary impact is on speed of auction,
not final prices or allocation.
Table 5 contains a summary of the jump bid activity observed in the experiments. To
be very conservative about defining a jump bid, these numbers were constructed by defining
a jump bid as any bid that is greater than 7.5% of the previous bid. The table lists the
number of total bids as well as the number of jump bids for each experimental auction.
Jump bids by this definition comprise as few as 7% of the bids in an auction to as much
as 32%. The table also lists the last bid in the auction that was a jump bid as well as the
number of final prices set by jump bids. There were a few jump bids that did result in the
bidder winning the item, but as can be seen from the eﬃciency and price results reported
previously, these had generally minor eﬀects on both.
Figure 2 shows a more detailed picture of the jump bid activity in the auctions. This
graph depicts the percent of the jump bids that were made in each auction as a function
of the percent of the auction that has been completed. By the midpoint of the auctions,
between 60 and 100% of the jump bids that will be made in these auctions have been made.
Right after the midpoint of the auction, we can see that most are clustered in the 70-80%
range. This shows that most of the jump bid activity occurs early in the auction, although
a few do show up later. This graph also contains a line describing the jump bid activity in
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Figure 2: Out of the total number of jump bids that were made in each auction, each line
shows the percentage that had been made at each point during the auctions.
the UK3G auction that will be discussed in more detail later.
Result 3: The number of bids fall short of the maximum number due to jump bids,
which seem to have as a purpose, speeding the auction.
Table 6 compares the actual number of bids to the maximum number of bids for each
auction. Not surprisingly, the actual number of bids is always lower. The reason they
are typically so much lower is that not all of the bids were at the minimum level and
this is indicated in the table by the average increment being, at times, significantly above
1.05. Most of the bids, however, were right around 1.05 as indicated by the medians
Experiment Actual Max Bids Average Inc Median Inc
1 69 87 1.059 1.051
2 57 87 1.096 1.056
3 135 196 1.080 1.051
4-1 136 196 1.075 1.053
4-2 112 196 1.091 1.053
4-3 50 147 1.185 1.053
Table 6: Time to complete for each auction.
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being almost exactly 1.0511. By comparing these results with the closing price results,
it becomes apparent that although jump bidding is used by bidders in ascending price
auctions, their primary use seems to be to speed the auction along while having little
impact on closing prices. Many seem to try to claim that such jump-bidding behavior is a
signalling phenomenon as described in ?), for aﬃliated values, or ?), for private values, but
even a very casual comparison of the predictions of the models in those papers to the data
should indicate that the observed behavior is not well described by signalling. Signalling
would involve submitting jumps of a very large size to signal other bidders to drop out either
because the jumping bidder has a value too high to compete with, ?), or because it would
be too costly to continue bidding against them, ?). Jumps of this size are not observed
and it would be diﬃcult to explain in the context of these models why a bidder who has
“signalled” with 10-15 small jumps in previous rounds to no eﬀect would continue doing so
or for that matter why someone would believe that a bid of 7.5%-10% above the previous
high bid when the minimum increment is 5% would scare any serious other bidders away.
Further investigation of the nature of jump bids in ascending auctions can be found in ?).
5.2.2 The Reliability of the Principle of Surplus Maximization
Evaluation of the model is diﬃcult since there is not a rigorous criteria for judging the
absolute level of performance of the model and because there is no known suitable alternative
model to use in comparing relative performance levels. The results below summarize our
attempts to identify the magnitude, nature and source of any deviations between the model
predictions and the observed behavior.
Result 4: The Principle of Surplus Maximization can be used to generate predictions
of which item a bidder will place a bid that have an overall accuracy rate of 50%. Much of
the error of the model can be attributed to (i) bids placed on identical items as opposed to
the one with the highest surplus and (ii) small cost of errors to the bidder. Using the model
to predict the class of item bid on is accurate 69% of the time with the “errors” occurring
when the surplus diﬀerential is small.12
Since we know the values the subjects had during the experiments we can use them to
predict which object they will bid on each time they bid. Doing so yields a 50% accuracy
rate when predicting which among the 8 objects a bidder will bid on. From the “wrong”
choices that bidders made, it is possible to compute how much they lost by bidding on
the object that did not have the highest surplus attached to it. In most of the cases, the
lost or foregone surplus was less than $1 and the overall distribution displays a standard
11The reason the medians are not exactly 1.05 is due to the fact that minimum accepted bids were rounded
to the nearest ten’s value. Consequently most of the actual bid increments were things like 1.049, 1.051 and
1.052.
12To conserve space most of the detailed support for this result has been eliminated, but is still available
in an extended version of the paper available from the authors.
17
-600 -400 -200 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
Surplus for Type A - Surplus of Type B
0
5
10
0
5
10
Prediction is Wrong
Prediction is RightPe
rc
en
t i
n 
R
an
ge
Figure 3: Histograms of diﬀerence in surplus between bidding on type A items versus type B
items for all bids placed in experiments split into cases in which model prediction is correct
and when it is not.
exponential decay pattern with the highest peak of the observations of loss being close to 0
with a rapid decay setting in soon after.
Due to those results and the speed with which subjects were submitting bids one might
propose that they looked generally to see whether A items or B items generated more
surplus and bid on one from the group that did so. Predicting which among the two groups
the subjects would bid on yields a 69% accuracy rate. In some sessions the accuracy rate
was above 80%. If one computes the actual surplus diﬀerential that existed for every bidder
“mistake”, SDt = (vi(A) − pt(A)) − (vi(B) − pt(B)), and compares this with the surplus
diﬀerential for “correct” bids, then two regularities are observed. First, the mean of the
distribution of surplus diﬀerentials when the prediction is wrong is statistically significantly
lower than when the prediction is correct. Second, figure 3 contains the histograms of values
of the raw surplus diﬀerential for when bidders made the “right” bid and when they made
the “wrong” bid. Notice that when bidders make the unpredicted choice, the distribution
has a single peak almost exactly at 0 and the distribution is relatively tight. When the
model predicts correctly, there is actually a depression around 0 and then two peaks on
either side and the tails of the distribution are longer and fatter. This indicates that when
the surplus diﬀerential is approximately 0, bidders are more likely to make a mistake but
as the surplus diﬀerential gets larger, mistakes decrease. This is the error pattern predicted
by a model of probabilistic choice.
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Bidder 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
# of Estimates 0 4 2 4 2 4 5 4 4 3 1 1
Table 7: Breakdown of which bidders yielded bid histories that resulted in meaningful
parameter estimates.
5.2.3 Results of Value Estimation
As found in the previous section, the average price of the A and B items worked very well
in terms of predicting which one a bidder will bid on. Consequently instead of having the
model predict which among the 8 items our bidders will bid on, the model will just be set
up to predict whether they will bid on an item of type A or of type B. For the price of a
type A item we will use the average of the prices of all units of that type and the same for
B items.
The version of the value function used in the experiments is a one parameter function
that expresses the bidders value in terms of francs per MHz as represented by the parameter
γi. The loss function maximized here is similar to equation 5, but simplified to two items
and no withdrawal decision. Since we do know the true values for γi, we can compare the
estimates, eγi to the real values as is done in table 8. In conducting the estimations, bounds
were placed on the parameters of γi ∈ [80, 230] and λ ∈ [1, 20]. The main reason for using
the bounds was to aid in the optimization process. Many of the bidders in the experiments
had their values estimated on one of the bounds. These were typically bidders of type 1 -3
who only bid on type A items or bidders 10-12 who dropped out early and only bid on type
B items. For the bidders who only bid on A items, left unconstrained, the optimization
process would have arrived at very large and potentially infinite values for γi. Another use
for the bounds therefore was to eliminate such obviously pathological estimates. This points
out one weakness of this model which is that in order to generate accurate value estimates,
bidders must be observed bidding on diﬀerent objects and switching in a systematic manner.
If such behavior is not observed, this technique will not be able to generate accurate value
estimations.
To further emphasize this point, table 7 gives a breakdown by bidder number of how
many of each type we were able to recover meaningful parameter estimates from. This shows
quite clearly that the only bidders we were typically able to recover parameters from were
those with intermediate values such that they would be induced to switch between bidding
from one type of item to another. This will become more important in the discussion of the
field results later.
The results contained in table 8 lead to the following result:
Result 5: For 50% of those bidders who reveal information about their values through
their bidding behavior, parameter estimates are obtained that are statistically indistinguish-
able from their true parameters.
There were a total of 68 bidders in the experiments and interior parameter estimates were
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Experiment Average of |eγi − γi| Median Standard Dev % Correct Preds
1 15.0 11.5 16.1 0.83
2 54.3 49.5 25.1 0.83
3 33.4 23.0 31.1 0.78
4 31.1 23.7 24.5 0.87
5 35.3 20.6 29.9 0.78
6 41.8 43.8 14.3 0.75
Combined 34.1 24.4 26.0 0.81
Table 8: Comparison of esitmates of γi to the known values for those bidders not estimated
on bounds.
found for 32 of them. This means that roughly half of the bidders revealed useful information
about their values through their bidding behavior. Table 8 compares the absolute diﬀerence
between the estimated and actual parameters for those bidders for which an interior estimate
was found. These results show that the average diﬀerence between the estimated and actual
values of γi is around 34.113. To put this in the proper scale, remember that the actual
values of γi range from 200 for bidder 1 to 106.5 for bidder 12. If t-tests are conducted
to test the hypothesis that the estimated and real parameters are equal, this hypothesis
can not be rejected for 50% of those bidders whose parameters are estimated inside of the
bounds at a 5% significance level. Thus for at least half of those bidders who engage in
the switching behavior necessary to convey information about their values, we are able to
estimate their value parameters very precisely. For the other 50% of these bidders, some of
the estimates turn out quite imprecise while others just miss the 5% significance mark.
It should be noted that many of those bidders who fail the significance test or for whom
meaningful parameters can not be recovered, submitted very few bids in the auction. In fact
the average number of bids submitted by bidders for whom parameter estimates were not
recoverable was 7.00, while the averages were 8.34 for all bidders with recoverable parameters
and 10.07 for those 50% whose parameters were estimated precisely. Not surprisingly, then,
this indicates that the quality of the estimates tends to improve with the number of observed
bids. The interesting point though, is how few bids are needed before estimates of reasonable
accuracy can begin to be made.
Result 6: The internal consistency check results in a model accuracy of about 81% of
the bids accurately predicted.
This result is shown in the last column of table 8. The predictions were generated by
taking the estimated parameters and then making deterministic predictions that the bidder
would bid on the item that would yield the most surplus. This can be taken as an indication
13 If the bidders estimated on the bounds are included the aggregate results are average of 45.9, median
of 41.7 and standard deviation of 31.1. As discussed previously though, these results are controlled by the
choice of bounds and so are somewhat arbitrary.
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that the bidders do appear to bid in a systematic manner that is generally consistent with
the principle of surplus maximization and that in doing so, they are revealing information
about their values that this econometric technique can take advantage of.
One consequence of the noted small size of the bid histories for many of the bidders is
that we felt trying to obtain partial history estimates from the experimental data would not
be feasible as this would involve trying to make inferences from less than 3-4 data points
in most cases. Consequently, we will present no results on partial data set estimates in this
section, although we will be able to do so for the field study.
6 Field Data
6.1 Description of Data Set
The motivation for this project was to develop a model of bidder behavior in Simultaneous
Ascending Auctions that could be applied to field data. Due to its strategic simplicity, the
field data set that we will investigate is taken from the U.K. auction for licenses to provide
third generation wireless services (also called the U.K. UMTS auction). In this auction
there were 5 licenses up for sale in a simultaneous multiple round auction. It began on
March 6, 2000 and lasted 150 rounds, closing on April 27, 2000. The total revenue for this
auction was £22.477 billion or approximately $33.2 billion14.
The licenses in this auction can be divided into three groups. The A block license was
the largest license and contained 35 MHz of spectrum. The B block license contained 30
MHz of spectrum while blocks C, D and E all contained 25 MHz. For most purposes, the
only diﬀerence between these licenses was the amount of spectrum they contained. Prior to
the auction, some bidders expressed the opinion that only 25 MHz was necessary to provide
service and that the extra 5 or 10 MHz in the A or B block was not necessary. This is the
reason for using the two parameter version of the value function, equation 3.
There were 13 bidders participating in the auction and each bidder was allowed to win
at most one license in the auction. Four of these bidders held existing licenses to provide
cellular or PCS service and were barred by the auction rules from bidding on the A block
license. This was done in an attempt by the Radiocommunications Agency in the UK to
ensure that at least one new entrant was able to enter the wireless communications market
in the UK as a result of the auction.
The results of the UK 3G auction are contained in table 9 including the opening price,
closing price and winning bidder for each license. In the end, the four existing operators
all won one of the B-E licenses and the one lone new entrant winner, won the reserved A
block license. It is interesting to note that although the A block license is the largest of the
five, it sold at only the second highest price and its price is significantly less than the price
for license B while not being much higher than the prices for C-E. One might suspect that
this would cause a problem for the simple value function that suggests bidder values are
14Exchange rate was approximately 1 US dollar to .677227 British Pounds on April 27, 2000.
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License Opening Price
(in hundreds of millions)
Closing Price
(in hundreds of millions)
Winning Bidder
A £1.25 £43.847 TIW
B £1.07 £59.640 Vodaphone
C £0.89 £40.301 BT3G
D £0.89 £40.036 One2One
E £0.89 £40.950 Orange
Table 9: Summary results of UK 3G auction.
Bidder A B C-E Total Round Withdrawn
3GUK 4 — 60 64 95
BT3G — 33 74 107 —
Crescent — — 82 82 94
Epsilon — — 58 58 98
NTL Mobile 25 — 33 58 150
One.Tel 2 — 79 81 101
One2One — — 105 105 —
Orange — 18 27 45 —
Spectrum Co. 21 5 22 48 97
Telefonica 6 1 43 50 133
TIW 12 5 52 69 —
Vodafone — 43 — 43 —
Worldcom 5 — 57 62 121
Table 10: Number of bids placed by each bidder on each item and round that they withdrew.
strictly increasing in MHz. Since, however, the four incumbent operators were prevented
from bidding on the A block license, these results do not contradict the form of the value
function. One or more of the 4 incumbents could have had a value for the A block license
higher than the £4.5 billion bid by TIW, but were unable to express that value due to the
restrictions.
Before examining the parameter estimates it will be useful to get an idea of the bidding
behavior. Table 10 shows how often each bidder bid on licenses of each type and when they
dropped out of the auction. Notice that there were 3 bidders who never bid on any licenses
other than C-E15. These bidders are giving away very little information about their values
that our approach can take advantage of until they drop out of the auction. All we will be
able to do for these bidders prior to their dropout is fix a value for βi of 0. There is one
bidder, Vodafone, who does the same thing by bidding on B the entire auction but as we
will see, it is possible to obtain a reasonable value estimate from this behavior. A few other
15These are Crescent, Epsilon and One2One.
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bidders only switch a few times16 and therefore do not reveal much information. The rest
of the bidders are the ones the model should be more likely to gain some insight on during
the auction. These are BT3G, NTL Mobile, Orange, Spectrum Co and TIW.
As a final note about the nature of the data, we can make one observation in regard to
the impact of jump bids on the outcome of the auction:
Observation 2: As in the experiments, there were a number of jump bids, but they had
no apparent impact on the outcome of the auction and the overall pattern of jump bids is
similar to that observed in the experiments.
There were 355 bids in the UK3G auction that lead to new high bids. Out of those,
46 of them would be classified as jump bids using the same definition used earlier which is
a bid that is more than 7.5% greater than the previous high bid. The last such bid was
placed in round 91 of the auction on license C. This license received 29 more bids over the
course of the rest of the auction. There were, of course, many bids placed after this point
that were above the minimum required amount but most were very modestly above the
minimum and it would seem strange to characterize these as true “jumps”. This includes
the last bid made by Vodafone to win the B license. In round 143, Vodafone placed a bid
that was 2.8% above the previous high bid even though they were only required to place a
bid 1.5% higher. It would seem fairly diﬃcult to support a claim that either a bid this far
in excess of the minimum increment or the much larger jumps made earlier in the auction
could have had a significantly negative impact on the eﬃciency of the auction.
Referring back to figure 2, the second part of the observation becomes clear. The line
indicating the pattern of jump bidding in the UK3G rises in manner quite similar to what
was observed in the experiments indicating that most of the jump bids occurred early in
the auction. This graph also shows again that there were no jump bids of significant size
in the last 40% of the auction (rounds 92-150).
6.2 Results
There are several ways that we will examine the results from estimating the model on the
field data. The first thing we will do is estimate the parameters of equation 5 on the full
history of the auction for each bidder. We will compare those value estimates with the
final results to determine how reasonable they appear. We will then move on to looking
at how well the model can perform on partial histories of the data set. We will generate
parameter estimates with only part of the data set and then compare those estimates to
the final results of the auction.
All of the estimates in this section were obtained through estimating equation 5 sepa-
rately for each bidder. This objective function can result in a very diﬃcult surface to find a
global maximum over, so a simulated annealing algorithm was used for the optimization17.
Standard errors of the parameter estimates were computed using a jackknife procedure.
163GUK, One.Tel, and Worldcom.
17The version of the algorithm adapted by E.G. Tsionas for Gauss was used as the base for the algorithm.
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In this implementation, if a bidder places j bids during the auction, estimates of the pa-
rameters were obtained using j subsets of the data with each estimation leaving out one
observation from the data set. The standard errors of the estimates are then the standard
errors of the empirical distribution of estimates. Since the extra zeros should ultimately not
matter, the prices of the licenses were normalized by dividing by 100 million as was done
in table 9 to make them more manageable. All prices and parameter estimates below are
reported according to this normalization. The estimates were performed with bounds on all
of the parameters: γi ∈ [0.60, 20.00], βi ∈ [0.00, 20.00], and λi ∈ [1.00, 20.00]18. Therefore if
a value is found for γi of 1, this can be interpreted as the bidder valuing spectrum at the
level of £100 million per MHz.
6.2.1 Full Data Set Estimates
The first test of the approach is how accurately it is able to estimate parameters for bidder
value functions given the entire history of the auction. The parameters with standard errors
for full history estimates are found in table 11. From the results in this table, we can find
our next result:
Result 7: The model passes consistency requirements in the sense that (i) parameter
estimates for only one out of the 13 bidder constitute a serious bound violation (ii) final
prices are largely consistent with those predicted based on the estimated values (iii) the
estimated parameters accurately predict around 78% of the actual choices made.
The first thing to notice about these estimates is that all but two of the estimates for
λi are pegged at the upper bound of 20 with virtually no variance to the estimate. Recall
that this is the parameter that captures the individuals sensitivity to surplus diﬀerentials
or perhaps an indication of their propensity to best respond. This result is due to the fact
that many of these bidders appear to be best responding very strongly according to their
estimated values, which means that λi will be estimated at the upper bound regardless of
what that value is. This cutoﬀ of 20 was chosen simply as a reasonable upper bound as it
implies a very strong degree of best responding already and raising it does little to change
any of the results.
Since we do not know the true values for βi and γi as we did in the experiments, we
can not directly measure how close these come to true values. A simple consistency check
is to examine the prices for the items at the point at which the bidders dropped out of the
auction. These prices can give us bounds on what we should expect to find for βi and γi .
This can be done simply by looking at the last bid placed by each bidder and finding values
for βi and γi that rationalize their choice.
18The bounds on γ were imposed solely to aid in the optimization process and were constructed by finding
a parameter range that resulted in no bidders being estimated on boundaries. β was bounded below by 0
as there is no reason why extra spectrum should harm the value of a license and above by 20 to aid in the
optimization process. λ was bounded below by 1 to ensure that we obtain ρk ∈ [0, 1] and above by 20, again
just to have a reasonable upper bound cutoﬀ. Bidders were estimated on this bound, but that is unlikely to
cause a problem.
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The bounds are listed in table 11 as bβi and bγi. All numbers should be taken as upper
bounds except for those underlined which are lower bounds. A comparison between the
bound requirements and the estimated values for βi and γi reveal that among 26 parameters
there are several estimates found right on the bounds but bound violations are found for
four parameters across 3 bidders. The first is in the estimated value of βi for Spectrum Co.
as the estimated value of βi is 0.26, but the bound restriction is 0.26 = βi < bβi = 0.14 which
obviously does not hold. This is not, however, too damaging of a violation since Spectrum
Co. was the third bidder to drop out of the auction. The second violation at first glance
looks much more severe as Vodafone should have an estimated γi ≥ 1.58 by the argument
of these bounds but the estimate is 0.58. This turns out not to be a real violation of the
spirit of the bounds. In this case the actual restriction supposedly violated requires that
the combination of the values of γi and βi be such that 25 ∗ γi + 5 ∗ βi − 57.99 ≥ 0 or the
surplus from bidding on the B license is greater than 0. The bound in the table was found
by substituting in bβi = 3.71 found through a diﬀerent restriction and solving for γi. Using
that value of βi, this restriction does not hold, but the actual estimated values of γi and βi
do satisfy this joint restriction as 25 ∗ .58 + 5 ∗ 14.66− 57.99 = 29. 81 > 0.
The only serious violation of the bounds is found for NTL Mobile. The value that they
are estimated to have is the highest among the bidders in the auction by a fair margin, but
they did not win an item in the auction and thus did not express this full value in their
bidding behavior. They were however the last bidder to drop out of the auction causing it to
close. As will be seen below, this potential overestimation of NTL’s values is the main cause
of some of the prediction errors that will be made oﬀ of this collection of value estimates.
The next check on the estimated values is to determine whether or not they match with
the final price and allocation results in the real auction. This can be done by taking the
estimated values and predicting closing prices and winning bidders as was done with the
experiment values. Results are contained in table 12. The main allocation error is that
NTL Mobile was predicted to win the A block license instead of TIW. TIW was, however,
estimated to have second highest value for A among those eligible to win it. The diﬀerence
in values was quite large as the value estimate for NTL was 98.97 and 41.84 for TIW.
Looking back at table 11 we can also see that the estimated parameters for NTL had one
of the worst fits and the highest standard deviation. This error also pushed One2One out
of the C-E position. One2One was, however, estimated to be the last excluded bidder on
licenses C-E and would have been predicted as a winner had NTL not taken the A license
from TIW.
The only other inaccuracy is a rather severe underestimation of the price of the B license.
There are two possible ways to explain this result. Based on these estimates, Orange was
the price setting bidder while BT3G was the price setting bidder in the real auction. If
we had obtained either a lower estimate for Orange’s value for the C-E licenses or a higher
estimate for BT3G’s value for the B license, either would have resulted in a higher price
prediction for the B license. Thus the error could be thought to have been derived from
either estimate.
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Bidder γi βi λi bγi bβi Det PR Prob PR
3GUK 0.66
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
20
(0.00)
0.84 0.22 0.80 0.35
BT3G 1.61
(0.00)
0.67
(0.01)
20
(0.00)
1.61 4.05 0.77 0.31
Crescent 0.73
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
20
(0.00)
0.73 0.13 0.99 0.41
Epsilon 0.83
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
20
(0.00)
0.89 0.09 0.73 0.37
NTL Mobile 3.71
(0.56)
0.63
(0.04)
20
(4.49)
1.63∗ 0.43∗ 0.46 0.17
One.Tel 0.87
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
20
(0.00)
0.96 0.33 0.96 0.40
One2One 1.60
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
20
(0.00)
1.60 4.10 0.99 0.41
Orange 2.84
(0.09)
1.21
(0.04)
20
(0.00)
1.60 4.09 0.42 0.21
Spectrum Co. 0.84
(0.01)
0.22
(0.02)
20
(0.00)
0.87 0.14∗ 0.59 0.31
Telefonica 1.47
(0.01)
0.18
(0.01)
20
(0.00)
1.50 0.76 0.53 0.26
TIW 1.66
(0.01)
0.06
(0.01)
20
(0.00)
1.47 0.71 0.65 0.16
Vodafone 0.58
(0.48)
14.66
(3.39)
17.17
(3.42)
1.58∗ 3.71 1.00 1.00
Worldcom 1.27
(0.01)
0.00
(0.00)
20
(0.00)
1.36 0.65 0.87 0.33
Table 11: Full data set parameter estimates with standard errors. bγ and bβ are the implied
bounds on the parameter based on dropout prices. Lower bounds are underlined, all others
are upper bounds. Det PR and Prob PR represent the prediction rate of the deterministic
model and the probabilistic model respectively.
License A B CDE
Pred Win NTL Mobile Vodafone Orange TIW BT3G
Actual Win TIW Vodafone Orange One2One BT3G
Pred Price £40.70 £46.10 £40.04
Actual Price £43.847 £59.640 £40.301 £40.036 £40.950
Table 12: Predicted outcome of UK Auction from full data set parameter estimates com-
pared with actual results. Prices are in hundreds of millions of British Pounds.
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6.2.2 Partial Data Set Estimates
The real test for this model is in how it is able to perform in estimating bidder values on
only part of the data set. If this methodology is going to be useful during the auction
to either the auctioneer, then it must be able to gain decent estimates of bidder values
during the auction. For the purposes of the auctioneer we would argue that the standard
for “decent” is really obtaining estimates that are of the approximate order of magnitude
of the final prices as this is all that is needed by the auctioneer. By performing estimates of
the parameters based on using the first 75 and then the first 100 out of the full 150 periods
of the auction, we can find our next result:
Observation 3: Comparing 75 and 100 period estimates to full history estimates shows
that the estimates of βi lock in correctly while the early estimates of γi are not as precise.
To conserve space, we have omitted listing out all of the parameter estimates for the
bidders, but will characterize the results. There were four bidders who dropped out of
the auction between rounds 75 and 100: 3GUK, Crescent, Epsilon and Spectrum Co. It
should be no surprise that the 100 period and full history parameter estimates are the same.
For most of the bidders the estimated values for βi are typically fairly close over all three
estimates while the estimate on γi varies considerably more. In most cases, the reason γi
varies so much has to do with the fact that the bidders were only bidding on items C-E.
When a bidder does this, the only information conveyed is that they see little value in the
extra 5-10 MHz, or βi is zero, and that they think the first 25 is worth at least as much
as the current price. For these bidders a reliable estimate of γi is not obtainable until they
drop out. For the bidders who engage in more switching, this is a manifestation of the
relatively weak identification of γi that was discussed earlier.
The best way to evaluate these value estimates from the point of view of the auctioneer
will be to use them to generate auction closing predictions of revenue and winning bidders.
These are found in table 13 and provide the support for result 8.
Result 8: The value estimates obtained using only partial data sets are able to generate
auction closing predictions, that are reasonably accurate. If these predictions are modified
based upon knowledge available to the auctioneer during the auction, these predictions can
be significantly improved.
In examining table 13, it is clear that the winning bidder predictions remain fairly
constant across all estimations, with the minor mistake of predicting NTL Mobile winning
the A block instead of TIW persisting and causing a few minor mistakes in the C, D and E
block predictions. In most cases, 3 out of the 5 eventual winners are predicted accurately
and the 2 errors are not made by large margins when the actual estimated values are
examined19. In regard to price predictions, the errors seem a bit more problematic as the
19At the 75 period mark, there are several bidders estimated to have the same value as One2One (11.05)
for C-E including TIW, Worldcom, 3GUK and Crescent while BT3G’s value is estimated at 10.525. The
predicted values for BT3G and One2One at the 100 period mark for C, D and E are 22.76 and 22.60
respectively. The estimated value for Worldcom is 22.89.
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License A B CDE
75 PD Win NTL Mobile Vodafone Orange Epsilon One2One
100 PD Win NTL Mobile Vodafone Orange TIW Worldcom
Full Win NTL Mobile Vodafone Orange TIW BT3G
Actual Win TIW Vodafone Orange One2One BT3G
75 PD Price £13.55 £15.12 £11.05
75 PD Alternative £15.96 £25.58 £21.51
100 PD Price £23.8 £27.12 £22.75
100 PD Alternative £42.77 £43.26 £38.89
Full PD Price £40.65 £46.07 £40.04
Actual Price £43.847 £59.640 £40.301 £40.036 £40.950
Table 13: Predicted outcome of UK Auction from partial data set parameter estimates
compared with actual results.
75 and 100 period price estimates range from £11.05 to £27.12 hundred million while the
actual closing prices range from £40.301 to £59.64 hundred million. The reason for this
is a definite underestimation of γi for a large number of bidders. In general, the bidders
for whom γi is underestimated are those who are not giving away much information in
their bidding activity by just bidding on C, D and E. Consequently, the bidders who will
eventually be price setting bidders are estimated to have values below their true values and
the result is underestimated prices.
In practice though, an auctioneer would be able to identify these problems and base
more general predictions upon the values of bidders for whom more reasonable estimates
can be obtained. If this is done at the 100 period mark, price estimates can be generated
as £42.77 for the A block, £43.26 for B and £38.89 for C-E. These estimates are obtained
by predicting that the price of C-E will be approximately the value estimated for Orange
and then finding prices for A and B that make NTL and Vodafone prefer to bid on A and
B. Similar estimates made at the 75 period mark generate prices of £21.51 for C-E, £25.58
for B and £15.96 for A. This essentially involves assuming that at least one of those bidders
who are not revealing their values will have a value in the same level as Orange, the bidder
with the lowest values among those for whom a reasonable estimate is achievable. The
100 period alternative estimates are now quite precise although the 75 period alternative
estimates still underestimate the final results.
These alternative estimates are important for demonstrating both the strength and
weakness of this methodology. The weakness is demonstrated by the need to use an alter-
native prediction due to the number of poor estimates. The strength is demonstrated by
the fact that in spite of this, an auctioneer who understands how to interpret the results
of estimations of this sort can extract useful information as the auction is occurring. As
stated in the introduction, what the auctioneer needs to know during the auction is how
close the auction is to finishing. At the 100 period mark, the answer was relatively precise
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in informing the auctioneer of the scale of the final prices. Even at the 75 period mark,
the information extracted would have been helpful. The reason is that the current prices
in round 75 were in the £1 billion range. A careful analysis of the estimation results yields
information that suggests that those bidders for whom reasonable estimates are recoverable
are willing to pay at least twice that. By making a relatively mild assumption that at least
a few of the bidders who have been hiding their values are willing to bid up to similar levels,
the auctioneer could have seen that the auction was far from closed and would have seen no
reason to begin slowing the auction down and perhaps would have wanted to speed it up20.
It was in approximately round 108, however, in which the UK auctioneer actually began to
slow the progress down by dropping the minimum increment from 5% to 4%. This was at
a time when the actual prices in the auction were roughly 2/3 of their eventual totals and
of the level that would have been predicted by this approach.
We should note that it is not our intention to be critical of the manner in which the
UK Radiocommunication Agency ran this auction. Given the information available to them
prior to the auction, their approach was likely reasonable as by most accounts they had little
expectation that the prices would go so high. Our intention is to point out that for future
auctioneers, they may be able to supplement any information obtained prior to the auction
about closing prices with information revealed during an auction based upon a methodology
similar to what is described here.
In addition to final price and allocation predictions, we can also generate predictions
about auction duration using the methodology described in section 4.5. This leads us to
our final result:
Result 9: The number of actual bids again falls short of the predicted maximum number
of bids. This is a function of jump bidding and inaccuracies in the price predictions.
The actual number of new high bids observed in the auction was 355. If one takes the
prices predicted from the full period estimates, assuming a constant minimum bid increment
of .05, the prediction is that it would take 382.53 high bids to reach the equilibrium prices.
The prediction made at the 100 period mark would be 325.93 according to the straight price
predictions versus 380.49 based on the alternate ones while the prices predicted at the 75
period mark would predict a total of 258.02 new high bids.
There are a couple of notes to make about these predictions. First is that they were made
assuming a constant increment even though the auctioneer lowered the increment several
times late in the auction. The result is that in some sense, the true predicted maximum
number of bids would be slightly higher. The constant increment was used for two reasons.
One is that when making the predictions from period 75 or 100, it was not known that
these changes would be made. Thus if the altered increments were incorporated into the
predictions it would involve using information not available at that point in the auction.
The second problem has to do with the second note about these predictions which is that,
20 It seems likely that one could improve the benefit of this approach by combining these estimates with a
Bayesian approach based upon updating pre-auction estimates or upon a general value distribution structure
that posits some overall structure to the values held by the bidders.
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although ideally one might like them to have been, these have not been translated into a
predicted number of rounds. Consequently, it would be diﬃcult to know when to engage
the increment changes. The reason the predictions have been presented as the number of
new high bids rather than rounds is that the translation into rounds is a very problematic
one. The issue is that waves or cycles can develop in a probabilistic manner on licenses C-E
and whether they occur or not can have a large impact on the number of rounds. In order
to generate precise predictions, then, we have neglected to translate the number of bids into
numbers of rounds.
In matching the predictions with the actual number of bids we see that the predictions
based on final value estimates and on the alternate 100 period estimates overpredict the
number of bids. This is due to the presence of the jump bids early in the auction spurring
the prices on quicker than the model predicts. The 75 period and 100 period predictions
are too low as a result of under predicting the final prices.
7 Conclusion
This study takes a step beyond the existing experimental literature. Both single item
ascending price auctions and simultaneous ascending price auctions have been previously
studied experimentally and the findings here in regard to eﬃciency and accuracy of the
equilibrium price predictions are completely consistent with reports in the literature. The
new results deal with an environment that is often found in the field and the development of
a model of bidder behavior in these auctions that is used as a foundation for an econometric
method for making value inferences and generating predictions about end of auction results.
With one exception, previous experiments that do not violate convexity conventions use only
additive values without restriction on the number of units purchased, a budget constraint
or other feature that would force the revelation of substitutions, switches or trade-oﬀs.
By contrast this paper examines the eﬃciency of simultaneous ascending auctions and the
possibility of modeling the dynamics under conditions where substitutions and switches can
be anticipated. The overall issue is the ability to use early auction data to predict when such
auctions might end and what prices will emerge. The results reported here are encouraging.
A disequilibrium model of bidder behavior is developed from two basic principles. These
principles hold that individual bids will be tendered on the items that yield the highest
surplus and that the bids will be the lowest possible given the rules. These can be combined
with a third principle to generate final price predictions based upon bidder values which is
that equilibration of the model will occur at the most eﬃcient possible equilibria in which no
bidder has a non-zero surplus. The resulting model can be used to estimate the underlying
values that exist in the bidding population and from those, predict bids and the ultimate
outcome of an auction.
Experimental results suggest that when needed, we can use the eﬃcient equilibrium as
a maintained assumption for predicting final prices. Experiments were used to assess the
foundations of the model and they demonstrate that prices are close to those predicted by
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the eﬃcient equilibrium (Result 1) and the results of the auctions are generally eﬃcient
(Result 2). Deviations from the eﬃcient prices and allocation are largely attributable to
increment requirements and mistakes. In particular “jump bids”, which have been reported
in the literature, have little or no eﬀect on final outcome or prices and seem have a purpose
of speeding the auction to a conclusion. Actual time of the auction from start to end fall
short of the model’s predictions (Result 3). The reason for this is jump bids (obs1). How
they can be incorporated into the model to get better predictions is an open question.
The experiments also produced support for the additional underpinnings of the model.
The Principle of Surplus Maximization does a good job (Result 4) by predicting accurately
50% of the individual items on which a bidder will place a bid and this prediction rate is
greatly improved if it includes in the prediction, items on which the values are very close.
That is, the errors of this principle are related to the value loss from its violation in that
errors tend to occur when items are close in value and tend not to occur when items are
farther apart in value.
Further support for the model is produced by checks on the internal consistency of value
estimates. The internal consistency rests on the ability of the model to recover values that
are known to the experimenter and to use those values to produce predictions of individual
bids (Results 5 and 6). The values of all bidders cannot be recovered but the values are
exactly correct for half of those that can be recovered. The accuracy of the model is
further revealed by the fact that for all individuals for whom measurements can be made
the accuracy of the model in predicting the item on which they bid is on average 81%.
The model was applied to field data from the UK Third Generation Mobile auction.
Application of the model to the experiments and to these field data has similarities. In the
field data, jump bidding is again observed and it seems to have an eﬀect of speeding the
auction while having no eﬀect on allocations. As a side note we point out that in recent field
applications of this mechanism to various real estate auctions, we have continued to observe
similar phenomena relating to jump bids. There is a clear pattern across these auctions, as
seen in the experiments and the UK auction, that jump bidding occurs early in the auction
when prices are well below expected final prices and then rarely occur late in the auction
as prices approach equilibrium values.
The internal consistency of the model when applied to the field data is on the same
order as the consistency when applied to the experiments. In the field, the predictions
of the model based on inferred values is 78%. (result 7). Of course the real challenge
is predicting final values and end of auction results early in the auction. Early bidding
behavior does not contain too much information about the final prices because the key
parameters are not known for some agents until they start dropping out. Value estimates
made from early bidding data are not stable but as the auction progresses they become
more so (observation 3). About two thirds of the way through the auction the winners
can be reasonably accurately predicted and with additional information available to the
auctioneer, the magnitude of the final prices can as well (result 8). As in the experimental
auctions, the auction duration predictions generally over predict the length of the auction
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as a result of jump bidding (result 9).
Overall the model reported here shows promise. The problem that motivated the study
was to develop a model that could be used early in the auction to produce predictions
about how long the auction would last and what the final prices would be. We can report
substantial progress toward this goal. The model produces the desired predictions. The
predictions are not bad and we have progress toward identifying problems that stand in the
way of improving the model.
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Experiment Instructions
Instruction Sheet
You are going to participate in an economics experiment. The instructions
are simple and if you follow them carefully you can earn considerable amounts
of money. You will be paid in cash unless instructed otherwise.
Eight items are oﬀered for sale through an electronic auction price. You
will be allowed to purchase one and only one item. Your earnings will be the
diﬀerence between what you pay for the item and the value of the item to you.
Two diﬀerent types of items will be auctioned. Four of item A will be auctioned
and four units of item B will also be auctioned. All of the items A are identical
to you and all of the items B are identical to you. The value to you of any of
the A items is shown on your record sheet and the value of any of the B items
are also shown on the sheet. However, the values you see may not be the same
as the values of other bidders.
After the auction is over you should record the price you paid. The diﬀerence
between the value of the item shown on your sheet and the price you paid is
the amount you earn. This, amount, together with any amount promised as a
showup fee, is the amount you take home. Obviously you do not want to pay
more for the item than its value to you.
These items will be sold at auction. As you can see there are more people
in the room than there are items. Some people will not buy a unit. Should you
choose not to buy you can take the OUTSIDE OPTION. It costs you nothing.
If you purchase an item you do not get the OUTSIDE OPTION.
The auction is a progressive auction with all items for sale at once. The
auction will open with a clock, shown at the top of the screen. It is counting
down. When a new bid is submitted the clock will reset. If the clock ever attains
zero the auction is over and each item is sold to the current high bidder. None
of the items are sold until the clock attains zero. Notice that it is not in your
interest to let the clock run down. There is no advantage to waiting until the
last second to bid because the clock will simply restart with the full time in
response to your bid. By waiting you risk missing the opportunity to bid due to
the clock accidentally running out and you have given others time to consider
their bids without being rushed.
As the prices of all items increase, they might be out of range for you to prof-
itably buy a unit. At any time during the auction you can take the OUTSIDE
OPTION and leave.
Details on the interface and submitting bids will be explained now.
Verbal Instruction Script
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Now that you have read the basic instructions for the experiment, I will lead
you through an explanation of the computer interface. Before the actual exper-
iment, I am going to ask you to practice for a few minutes on a sample environ-
ment. Please open up your web browser and go to http://eeps58.caltech.edu/hmpractice.
Scroll to the bottom of the screen and select “Practice Participant Login” and
then “Practice Bidding”. This will get you into the bid submission screen. The
screen for the experiment will look and function much like this one.
1. The first thing to notice is the box labeled “Time Remaining”. This is the count-
down clock that determines when the auction ends. This clock will start counting
down from 3 minutes and every time anyone submits a bid, it will reset. If the clock
ever reaches zero, then the auction is over. There is one clock for all items, so all items
are open for bidding until the auction closes. Note that as the auction progresses, we
may decrease the starting point of the clock down to 2 minutes or perhaps 1.5. As
the clock approaches 0, you will be notified by flashing lights. If you see these and
are willing to bid, you should do so quickly.
2. To the right of this you will see links to “Bidding Rules”. The rules under this link
are not the rules to be used for this experiment. There is also a screen for “Bidding
Screens and Functions.” This screen will explain the various boxes on the screen and
you can consult it as you are practicing. For now, I will give an overview of the rest
of the screen. If you have clicked on either of these links, please click back on the
“Highest Oﬀers” link as this takes you back to the main page.
3. You should notice two tables on the screen. I will first direct you to the “Highest
Oﬀers” table. This table is where you can see the current prices and minimum required
bids for each item. Every item in the auction will be listed by Lot # and the table
will include the bidder ID# of the current high bidder as well as their bid and what
will be required to surpass that bid. In the experiment, to place a bid on an item you
will need to surpass the current high bid by at least 5%. That is not listed on this
screen but it will be on the experiment screen.
4. You can determine what you wish to bid on by comparing the prices listed in this
table with the values listed on your sheet. Look at it now. You will see that there
will be two types of items in the experiment, type A and B. There will be 4 items of
each type. Items 1-4 will be of type A and 5-8 type B. The amount on your sheet
indicates what items of either type are worth to you in the event that you win one.
Note that your values may diﬀer from those of other bidders. As you read previously,
you will only be able to win a single item and you will be paid the diﬀerence between
your value and the price you pay in the auction.
5. Those bidders who are unable to win an item will be paid the amount listed as their
outside option. Note that the values listed on this sheet will convert to US $ at the
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rate of 100 experimental points or francs to the dollar. Thus if your value is listed as
1000 francs and you pay a price of 400, your payoﬀ will be 600 francs or $6.
6. Now that you understand how to find the prices of items and what the items are
worth to you, we can talk about submitting a bid. On the left side of the screen you
will see an “Oﬀer Submission Form”. This is what you will use to submit your bids.
After you have decided which item to bid on and how much you wish to bid, click on
the circle next to the item you want to bid on. Then enter the amount of the bid in
the oﬀer price box. No commas or $ are needed. Please be careful when entering in
your bid amount. An extra zero or two can cost you a large amount of money.
7. After you have entered in your bid amount, selected the correct item and verified
both, click on the “Submit Oﬀer” button to submit the bid. You should notice two
things happen. First, the time remaining clock resets. Second, if you have become
the high bidder on the item, it will be highlighted in yellow. So long as you retain
the high bid, it will continue to be highlighted in yellow and you will not need to bid.
If someone surpasses your bid, then the license will no longer be highlighted and you
may want to place a new bid.
8. Please practice placing bids for a few minutes to make sure you are comfortable with
the process. Raise your hand if you have a question or a problem and I will come and
help you.
Real link is at http://eeps58.caltech.edu/mark
Quiz
Identification Number Name
Please answer the following questions after you have been through all of the instructions.
The purpose of this quiz is simply to verify that you understand the rules of the experiment.
1. If you were to win item number 3 at a price of 2200, what would your payoﬀ be in
dollars?
2.If you were to win item number 7 at a price of 4200, what would be your payoﬀ in
dollars?
3. What would your payoﬀ be if you win nothing in the auction?
4.What does it mean when a cell in the “Highest Oﬀers” table is highlighted in yellow?
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